MILF No. 3/2000, pp. 50-54

The experience of using artillery in World War II and modern practice

Colonel A. B. BUDYAEV,

candidate of military sciences

FIFTY FIVE years separate us from the day when the Great Patriotic War ended. The participants in the Armed Forces have long completed their service, their combat experience accumulated by them is gradually forgotten, and yet this experience is of lasting importance.

Today, scientific research increasingly focuses on those forms and methods of armed struggle that are used abroad in the course of local wars. However, they suggest the use of the latest types of weapons and military equipment, which our Armed Forces, given the deplorable state of the country's economy, are unlikely to be equipped in the near future. That is why, determining ways to increase the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery, it is necessary to turn to the rich heritage of artillerymen of the Great Patriotic War.

In the preparation and conduct of military operations of the Russian Armed Forces, one of the main issues is on the organization of artillery intelligence. ATthe years of the war, it was divided into air and ground. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out by the crews of reconnaissance and reconnaissance aircraft, parts of which were transferred to the operational subordination to the artillery headquarters of the fronts, and from observation balloons. Ground reconnaissance was carried out from observation points (NP) of artillery commanders of all levels and artillery instrumental reconnaissance. In addition, special teams were allocated to monitor enemy artillery, and in some cases, artillery reconnaissance groups were sent over the front line. Then it was believed that discovering a goal was no less valor than hitting it. This position was confirmed literally in every battle. If the artillery fired not just “towards the enemy”, but according to well-known and well-established targets, success in the battle was guaranteed.

The enemy always tried to act suddenly, so he carefully disguised his battle formations, and it was not easy to open his fire system. Under these conditions, artillery reconnaissance worked with particular stress, and the duty of artillery reconnaissance at observation posts was organized on the principle of guarding, which emphasized the responsibility of the duty personnel. This approach had a beneficial effect on the discipline of observers, the organization of their work and did not allow the unmasking of intelligence sites.

As the combat experience testifies, optical reconnaissance gave the greatest effect in cases where the reconnaissance sector assigned to one observer did not exceed 1-00 (6 °), so that he had the opportunity to study every terrain, to detect even inconspicuous targets.

Optical reconnaissance was based on a wide network of observation posts, some of which were carried forward into infantry combat formations, and sometimes beyond the line of contact between troops. It also happened that the most distant targets could be opened from points located at heights in the depths of our battle formation, and the targets at the front line could be scouted only at the maximum approximation to them. So in

the battle of Stalingrad, scouts of one of the artillery regiments, sergeants Karyan and Razuvaev, observed 200 m from the enemy and found three well-camouflaged guns, a machine gun battery and a large dugout in a day. An artillery battery was found in the same regiment, the exact coordinates of which could only be determined when Lieutenant Chernyak crept close to the German front line. In both cases, the targets were destroyed.

Very often, artillery scouts were included in military intelligence groups and nightly search parties. With them, they seeped over the front line of the enemy’s defense and scouted targets, and subsequently often managed fire.

The use of all types of artillery reconnaissance, the inclusion of artillerymen in military reconnaissance groups, as well as the careful organization of the work of each observer, the collection and processing of reconnaissance data, provided sufficiently complete information about the targets. Artillery Major General M.V. Rostovtsev, sharing his combat experience, wrote: "... our fire will always be adequately accurate if the artillery commanders are painstakingly engaged in reconnaissance, and combined arms will contribute to this in every way."

Consider how you can today using existing means of artillery reconnaissance, increase its effectiveness.

For reconnaissance in artillery units of combined arms and units, it is advisable to have artillery observer groupsof two or three people: the group commander (sergeant, and in some cases the officer is a specialist in artillery fire control and topographic and geodetic reference), rangefinder scout, sniper signalman. The armament of the group should include a laser rangefinder with a coordinate converter, a navigation device, a portable radio station, and special small arms.

We propose to have the number of groups equal to the number of guns in the artillery battery (in the mortar battery - to the number of fire platoons). We believe that in the rocket artillery and artillery of the army (corps) kit, optical reconnaissance should be carried out by the forces of existing bodies.

The presence in the regimental and divisional units of such a structure of reconnaissance bodies will make it possible to organize effective defeat of the enemy from the maximum range of artillery fire. For example, in the transition to defense outside contact with the enemy, behind the front line of our troops, a network of advanced observation posts should be deployed in advance. Observation points must be equipped in engineering terms and carefully masked. The targets for which artillery fire was prepared should be clearly visible from them, as well as the most likely routes for advancing the enemy. After completing missions from the leading NPs, the groups, while continuing to control artillery fire, move along a predetermined route into the battle formations of their troops.

The improvement of the organizational structure of artillery intelligence will be facilitated by the inclusion of units, formations and associations in the staff of artillery headquarters artillery intelligence control points.

Another major issue is deployment of artillery in the battle formations of troops.One of the main principles of organizing artillery combat operations during the years of World War II — massaging it in the main directions * - remains relevant in modern conditions. This implies both massaging artillery units (units) and massaging their fire.

According to the current statutory documents, the main firing positions are selected (depending on the organizational affiliation of the artillery and the conditions of the situation) at a distance of 2-6 km from the advanced units of their troops. This situation has remained unchanged since the Great Patriotic War. However, the range of fire of barrel artillery in those years was an average of 10 km. Today artillery capabilities surpass this figure. more than doubled.So, modern divisional artillery is capable of hitting an enemy almost to the entire depth of the combat mission of an offensive. As during the war years, artillery firing positions are assigned in the direction of the main strike of our troops. A considerable amount of artillery is concentrated in rather narrow bands of the upcoming offensive of units and formations, and at least 2-3 hours before the start of artillery preparation for the attack. With modern intelligence, hiding such a group from the enemy is very problematic. In addition, concentrating a large number of artillery firing units in the direction of the main blow,we give the enemy the opportunity to reveal our plan in advance. In addition, when going on the offensive with advance from depth, the deployment of combined arms units for the attack will occur in the area of \u200b\u200bartillery firing positions, which at that time conduct high-density fire, carrying out, as a rule, the last fire attack of artillery preparation for the attack. Firing positions, especially in summer conditions, will be shrouded in dust and smoke, which will significantly complicate the actions of tank and motorized infantry units.

In our opinion, the massing of artillery should be ensured primarily by massaging its fire.By placing the bulk of the firing positions on the flanks of battle units,acting in the direction of the main attack (breakout area), we, firstly, mislead the enemy about their intentions, and secondly, provide the necessary depth of his defeat. In the main direction, it is possible to equip false firing positions and imitate firing from them by nomadic guns. This arrangement is also supported by the fact that the effectiveness of firing at platoon strongholds from firing positions located on the flanks is 1.5-2 times higher than when they were defeated from the front.

In a defensive battle, the main artillery firing positions are assigned in tank-dangerous directions between battalions of the first and second echelons. In a small space, artillery groups of units, formations, and sometimes associations are deployed. Such massing of artillery units increases their vulnerability, unmasks areas on which the stability of defense depends on their retention. The increased capabilities of artillery in depth of destruction allow us to designate areas of the main firing positions at a greater distance from our front line. So, to group artillery units they can be selected between the second and third positions of the defense of our troops and aside from the direction of concentration of the main efforts.Deployment of units of the artillery group of the association is also possible there, in some cases it can be placed behind the third position.

The expediency of this approach is also indicated by the fact that during the fire reflection of the attack, especially when the enemy wedges into the defense areas of the first-tier battalions, artillery must fire with maximum intensity, without moving to reserve firing positions.

Between the first and second positions in the most important tank hazardous areas, taking into account the terrain, firing positions should be assigned to artillery divisions from the regiment artillery group. They must be engineered and camouflaged. In the event of a fight against enemy armored objects that broke into the OP region, it is necessary to prepare sites for direct fire.

Separate consideration requires the issue of placing command and observation posts. AToffensive combat combined arms (units), as a rule, are amplified by a fairly large amount of artillery. In addition, they are also assigned supporting artillery units and units. The command and observation posts of batteries, divisions, and observation posts of artillery groups in a dense network cover all areas that are more or less suitable for their placement. In many cases, they are literally “overlaid”. For example, a regiment advancing on a breakthrough site can be strengthened and supported by at least two artillery divisions. This means that it will be necessary to deploy at least a dozen command and control posts with intervals of 100-200 m along the front with a depth of about 500 m. Given that command and observation posts of combined arms commanders, artillery of the senior commander, combat arms and special troops will be in the same area, then the difficulties arising in connection with this will become clear.

In the history of the war, a case is known when up to ten command and observation posts of infantry and artillery were at the dominant height in the range of the formation, which was preparing for the offensive. They had the most diverse device: some were well camouflaged and equipped with solid ceilings, others were built in a hurry, representing only open slots. The entire area in the area and on the approaches to it was covered with a web of wires. At each command and observation post, fighting life flowed in its own way. In some, the movement of soldiers and officers was strictly regulated. They disguised themselves on the approaches to the NP, choosing hidden paths for moving. In others, everyone walked openly, unmasking not only themselves, but also their neighbors. As soon as the division launched the offensive, the enemy artillery opened fire in height. The control of the units was disrupted, which primarily affected the interaction between the infantry and artillery and led to large losses of our troops.

The experience of soldiers, as well as the training of troops in the post-war period, shows that the issues of deploying command and observation and observation posts, especially in motorized rifle and artillery units located in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, should be addressed centrally in combined arms headquarters.When assessing the terrain, the combined arms headquarters should determine the areas suitable for the location of observation and command observation posts. The less of them in the offensive zone, the greater organization is necessary in their use. Otherwise, most commanders will prefer areas that are convenient for observation and it may turn out that the best of them will be occupied by those for whom they are less needed.

In addition, in each area where the observation points are located, it is necessary to appoint a common chief, with responsibility for maintaining order. He must determine the masking measures at the observation posts and monitor their implementation, outline the approaches, organize their equipment. In open sections of the route, it is necessary to arrange vertical masks, and in the areas fired by the enemy, tear off the message courses and gaps. Equipment locations should also be equipped. On the routes leading to the area where the observation posts are located, traffic controllers must be set up to meet arriving liaison officers, messengers and point them in the right direction.

We believe that it is necessary to refuse to place commanders of the artillery units of the army (corps) and rocket artillery on the KNP. Their workplace should be fire control pointslocated in areas of firing positions. This is due to the fact that it is at the firing positions that a large amount of work is carried out to carry out firing tasks, combat, technical and rear support. In addition, this will reduce the total number of observation posts, reduce the loss of command of artillery units.

Summing up the above, we want to once again emphasize the need for a creative approach to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, its processing, taking into account the peculiarities of armed struggle in modern conditions.

∗ In the most important operations of the final stage of the war, artillery densities reached 300 guns per 1 km of the breakthrough site.

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Artillery during the Second World War Part I

M. Zenkevich

Soviet artillery was created during the years of the Civil War and in its pre-war development went through two stages. In the period from 1927 to 1930. modernization of the artillery armament inherited from the tsarist army was carried out, as a result of which the basic tactical and technical characteristics of the guns were substantially improved in accordance with the new requirements, and this was done without large expenses on the basis of the available armament. Thanks to the modernization of artillery weapons, the firing range of artillery increased on average one and a half times. The increase in firing range was achieved by lengthening the trunks, increasing charges, increasing the elevation angle and improving the shape of the shells.

An increase in the power of the shot also required some modification of the carriages. In the carriage 76 mm guns arr. A balancing mechanism was introduced in 1902, muzzle brakes were delivered for 107-mm and 152-mm guns. A single sight of the 1930 model was adopted for all the guns. After modernization, the guns received new names: the 76-mm cannon of the 1902/30 model, the 122-mm howitzer 1910/30 etc. Of the new artillery designs developed during this period, the 76-mm regimental cannon arr. 1927 The beginning of the second stage in the development of Soviet artillery dates back to the early 1930s, when, as a result of the accelerated development of heavy industry, it became possible to begin the complete rearmament of artillery with new models.

On May 22, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted the system of artillery weapons developed by the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) for 1929-32. This was an important policy document for the development of Soviet artillery. It provided for the creation of anti-tank, battalion, regiment, division, corps and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). The system was adjusted for each five-year period and was the basis for the development of new tools. In accordance with it, in 1930 a 37-mm anti-tank gun was adopted. The gun carriage had sliding beds, which ensured a horizontal firing angle of up to 60 ° without moving the bed. In 1932, the 45-mm anti-tank gun was also adopted for use on a carriage with sliding beds. In 1937, the 45-mm cannon was improved: a semi-automatic system was introduced into the wedge gate, suspension was used, ballistic qualities were improved. Great work was carried out to rearm the division, corps and army artillery, as well as high-power artillery.

As a divisional gun, a 76-mm arr. 1939 with a semi-automatic wedge lock. The gun carriage of this gun had a rotating upper machine, high-speed lifting and turning mechanisms, and sliding beds. The undercarriage with suspension and rubber wheels on wheels allowed a speed of transportation of up to 35-40 km / h. In 1938, the 122-mm howitzer arr. 1938. This gun by its tactical and technical data far surpassed all foreign samples of this type. The armament artillery adopted the 107-mm gun mod. 1940 and 152 mm howitzer arr. 1938

The composition of the army artillery included: 122-mm gun mod. 1931/37 and 152 mm howitzer arr. 1937. The first prototype of a 122 mm gun was developed in 1931. A 122 mm gun mod. 1931/37 was obtained by imposing a barrel of a 122 mm gun arr. 1931 on a new carriage mod. 1937, adopted as a single gun mount for the 122 mm gun and 152 mm howitzer. For all guns of the divisional and corps artillery, a sight was adopted that was independent of the gun, allowing both to charge and direct the gun at the target. The problem of creating Soviet artillery of high power was also successfully resolved.

In the period from 1931 to 1939. adopted: 203 mm howitzer arr. 1931, 152-mm gun mod. 1935, 280 mm mortar arr. 1939, 210-mm gun mod. 1939 and 305-mm howitzer arr. 1939 Carriages 152-mm guns, 203-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars of the same type, on a caterpillar track. In the stowed position of the guns were two carts - the trunk and the gun carriage. In parallel with the development of the material part of artillery, important measures were also taken to improve the ammunition.

Soviet designers developed the most advanced long-range shells in form, as well as new types of armor-piercing shells. All shells were equipped with fuses and tubes of domestic production. It should be noted that the development of Soviet artillery was affected by such an idea that was widespread at that time abroad, as universalism. It was about creating the so-called universal or semi-universal guns, which could be both field and anti-aircraft. Despite the attractiveness of this idea, its implementation led to the creation of overly complex, heavy and expensive guns with low combat qualities. Therefore, after the creation and testing of a number of samples of such guns in the summer of 1935, a meeting of artillery designers was held with the participation of members of the government, at which the insolvency and harmfulness of universalism were revealed and the need for specialization of artillery in its combat purpose and types was revealed. The idea of \u200b\u200breplacing artillery with aircraft and tanks did not find support in the USSR either.

The German army, for example, went along this path, with the main emphasis on aviation, tanks and mortars. Speaking in the Kremlin in 1937, I.V. Stalin said: “The success of the war is not only decided by aviation. For the success of the war, artillery is an extremely valuable force. "I would like our artillery to show that it is first-class."

This line of creating powerful artillery was rigorously carried out, which was reflected, for example, in the sharp increase in the number of guns for all purposes. If on January 1, 1934 there were 17,000 guns in the Red Army, then on January 1, 1939 their number was 55790, and on June 22, 1941, 67355 (without the 50 mm mortars, of which there were 24158). In the prewar years, along with the rearmament of rifled artillery, extensive work was carried out to create mortars.

The first Soviet mortars were created in the early 30s, however, some leaders of the Red Army viewed them as a kind of "surrogate" of artillery, of interest only to the armies of underdeveloped states. However, after the mortars proved their high efficiency during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, their mass introduction into the troops began. The Red Army received 50-mm company and 82-mm battalion mortars, 107-mm mountain-pack and 120-mm regimental mortars. In total, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, over 40 thousand mortars were delivered to the Red Army. After the outbreak of the war, along with solving problems of increasing the supply of mortar and mortar weapons to the front, design bureaus and industrial enterprises developed and introduced new artillery systems into production. In 1942, the 76.2-mm divisional gun arr. 1941 (ZIS-3), the design of which, with high combat characteristics, fully met the requirements of in-line production. To combat enemy tanks in 1943, a 57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2 was developed on a gun carriage of a 76.2-mm gun arr. 1942

A little later, an even more powerful 100-mm gun arr. 1944 From 1943, 152-mm corps howitzers and 160-mm mortars began to enter the troops, which became an indispensable means of breaking through enemy defenses. In total, during the war years, industry produced 482.2 thousand guns.

Mortars were manufactured 351.8 thousand (4.5 times more than in Germany, and 1.7 times more than in the United States and the British Empire). In the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army also widely used rocket artillery. The beginning of its use can be considered the formation in June 1941 of the first separate battery, which had seven BM-13 installations. By December 1, 1941, there were already 7 regiments and 52 separate divisions in field rocket artillery, and at the end of the war, the Red Army had 7 divisions, 11 brigades, 114 regiments and 38 separate rocket artillery divisions, for which more than 10 thousand were made Multiply-charged self-propelled launchers and more than 12 million rockets.

  volley "Katyush"

  ZIS-3 76-MM GUN SAMPLE 1942

A few weeks after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow on January 5, 1942, it received the go-ahead ZIS-3 - the illustrious 76-mm divisional cannon.

“As a rule, we received tactical and technical requirements for the development of new guns from the Main Artillery Directorate,” says the famous artillery system designer V. Grabin. But some guns were developed on our own initiative. This was the case with the ZIS-3 divisional 76-mm gun. ” .

The caliber 76 mm - 3 inches - since the beginning of our century has been considered the classic caliber of a divisional gun. The cannon is powerful enough to hit the enemy’s manpower from closed positions, to suppress mortar and artillery batteries and other weapons. The guns are mobile enough to move along the battlefield with the forces of combat crew to accompany the advancing units not only with fire, but also with wheels, crushing bunkers and pillboxes with direct fire. The experience of the first world war. showed that when the trench defense was saturated with fire weapons, the advancing units needed melee artillery battalion and regiment. And the appearance of tanks required the creation of special anti-tank artillery.

Equipping the Red Army with military equipment has always been the focus of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On July 15, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a historic decision on the creation of new military equipment, including artillery. Fulfilling the program drawn up by the party, Soviet designers worked on the creation of both melee artillery and anti-tank artillery (37 and 45 mm guns). But when by the end of the 30s there was a gap between the capabilities of these anti-tank guns and tank armor, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed a tactical and technical task for a 76-mm divisional gun, capable of fighting against tanks.

Solving this problem, the design team, headed by V. Grabin, in 1936 created the 76-mm F-22 divisional cannon. Three years later, the F-22 SPM was adopted. In 1940, the same team developed a 57-mm anti-tank gun. And finally, in 1941, having placed a 76-mm barrel on the gun’s advanced carriage, the designers (A. Hvorostin, V. Norkin, K. Renne, V. Meshchaninov, P. Ivanov, V. Zemtsov, etc.) created the famous ZIS -3, - which was highly appreciated not only by our allies, but also by opponents.

... "The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm gun of the Second World War is absolutely justified," said German professor Wolf - a former head of the Krupp artillery construction department. - One can say without exaggeration that this is one of the most brilliant designs in the history of barrel artillery. "

ZIS-3 was the last and most advanced 76-mm divisional gun. Further development of this class of guns required the transition to a larger caliber. What is the secret to the success of the ZIS-3? What, if I may say so, is the "highlight" of its design?

V. Grabin answers these questions: "The ease, reliability, convenience of combat work of calculation, manufacturability and low cost." Indeed, without containing any fundamentally new components and solutions that would not be known in world practice, the ZIS-3 is an example of a successful design and engineering formation, an optimal combination of qualities. In ZIS-3 removed all non-working metal; the muzzle brake was used for the first time in domestic serial 76-mm divisional guns, which reduced the length of the rollback, reduced the weight of the retractable parts and made the carriage easier; riveted beds are replaced by lighter tubular beds. The leaf springs in the suspension device are replaced by lighter and more reliable spring springs: A carriage with sliding beds is used, which sharply increases the angle of horizontal fire. For the first time, a monoblock barrel was used for this caliber. But the main advantage of the ZIS-3 is its high technology.

The design team led by V. Grabin paid particular attention to this quality of guns. Working according to the method of accelerated design of artillery pieces, in which design and technological issues are resolved in parallel, engineers systematically reduced the number of parts needed from sample to sample. So, the F-22 had 2080 parts, the F-22 USV - 1057, and the ZIS-3 - only 719. Accordingly, the number of machine hours needed to make one gun was also reduced. In 1936, this value was 2034 hours, in 1939 - 1300, in 1942 - 1029 and in 1944 - 475! Thanks to its high technology, the ZIS-3 went down in history as the first gun in the world to be put into continuous production and conveyor assembly. By the end of 1942, only one factory produced up to 120 guns a day - before the war, this was its monthly program.

  ZIS-3 in tow T-70M

Another important result achieved by working with the method of accelerated design is wide unification — the use of identical parts, assemblies, mechanisms, and assemblies in different samples. It was the unification that enabled one plant to produce tens of thousands of guns for various purposes - tank, anti-tank and divisional. But it is symbolic that the one hundred thousandth gun of the 92nd plant was precisely the ZIS-3 - the most massive gun of the Great Patriotic War.

Projectile Type:		Primary. speed, m / s	The range is straight. shots at a target height of 2 m, m
High explosive
Armor-piercing
Sub-caliber armor.
Cumulative

  A-19 122-MM GUN SAMPLE 1931/1937

“In January 1943, our troops broke through the blockade and fought hard to expand the breakthrough at the famous Sinyavinsky heights,” recalls artillery marshal G. Odintsov, former commander of the artillery of the Leningrad Front: “The firing positions of one of the batteries of the 267th corps artillery regiment were in a swampy area, camouflaged by thickets of dense shrubs.Hearing in front of the roar of the tank engine, the eldest on the battery, not doubting that our tank, and fearing that he would not crush the gun, decided to warn the driver. carriage, he saw that a huge, unfamiliar tank with a cross on the tower was moving straight at the gun ... The shot was fired from some 50 meters away. The shell literally demolished the split tower, and its pieces hit the second armor with such force after the tank, that his crew escaped without even having time to turn off the engine, then our tankers pulled out enemy vehicles.

A working “tiger” passed through the streets of besieged Leningrad, and then both tanks became exhibits of a “trophy exhibition” in the Gorky Moscow Park of Culture and Rest. So the 122-mm hull cannon helped to capture whole one of the first “tigers” that appeared at the front, and helped the personnel of the Soviet Army to recognize the vulnerabilities of the “tigers”.

The First World War showed what a dear price France, England and Russia had to pay for neglecting heavy artillery. Counting on a maneuvering war, these countries relied on light highly mobile artillery, believing that heavy guns are unsuitable for rapid marches. And already during the war, they were forced to catch up with Germany and, catching up on what was lost, urgently create heavy guns. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, the United States and Britain considered corps artillery to be completely unnecessary, while France and Germany were satisfied with the modernized corps guns of the end of the First World War.

The situation was completely different in our country. In May 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved a system of artillery weapons for 1929-1932, and in June 1930 the 16th Congress of the CPSU (B.) Adopted a decision to accelerate the development of industry, and especially the defense, in every way. The industrialization of the country has become a solid foundation for the production of modern military equipment. In 1931, pursuant to the approved weapons system, the 122-mm A-19 cannon was manufactured at the artillery factory No. 172. This gun was intended for counter-battery combat, for disrupting the control of enemy troops, suppressing its rear, preventing the approach of reserves, the supply of ammunition, food, etc.

“The design of this gun, says Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service N. Komarov, was entrusted to the design bureau of the All-Union gun-arsenal association. The working group, headed by S. Shukalov, included S. Ananyev, V. Drozdov, G. Vodokhlebov, B Markov, S. Rykovskov, N. Torbin and I. The project was completed quickly and the drawings were immediately sent to the 172nd plant for the production of a prototype, but it turned out that the project was made without taking into account the equipment of the plant, and we had to redo the working drawings in relation to the technological possibly to the plant.

In terms of projectile power and firing range, the gun exceeded all foreign guns of this class. True, she came out a little heavier than them, but the great weight did not affect her fighting qualities, since she was designed for mechanical traction.

From the old artillery systems, the A-19 was distinguished by several innovations. The high initial velocity of the projectile increased the length of the barrel, and this, in turn, gave rise to difficulties with vertical aiming and with the transport of guns. To unload the lifting mechanism and facilitate the work of the gunner, we used a balancing mechanism; and in order to protect critical components and mechanisms of the gun from shock loads during transportation, the attachment mechanism is marching: before the hike, the barrel was separated from anti-recoil devices, pulled back over the cradle and secured with “stoppers to the carriage.” reciprocating devices allowed the mechanism of mutual closure.For the first time on the tools of such a large caliber were used sliding beds and a rotating upper machine, which provided an increase in the angle of the horizon cial bombardment; cushioning and metal wheel rim with a rubber busbar, allowed to transport an instrument according to highway speeds up to 20 km / h ".

After comprehensive testing of the prototype A-19 was adopted by the Red Army. In 1933, the barrel of the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1930 model was laid on the carriage of this gun, and the 152-mm gun of the 1910/1934 model was put into service, but work continued to improve the single carriage. And in 1937 two hull guns on a unified gun carriage were adopted by the Red Army - the 122-mm gun of the 1931/1937 model and the 152-mm howitzer - the gun of the 1937 model. In this gun carriage, the lifting and balancing mechanisms are divided into two independent units, the elevation angle is increased to 65 °, a normalized sight with an independent aiming line is installed.

The 122-mm cannon delivered a lot of bitter minutes to the Germans. There was not a single artillery preparation in which these remarkable guns would not have participated. With their fire, they crushed the armor of the Nazi "Ferdinand" and "Panther". It is no accident that this gun was used to create the famous self-propelled gun ISU-122. And it is no coincidence that this particular gun was one of the first to open fire on fascist Berlin on April 20, 1945.

122 mm cannon sample 1931/1937 years

  B-4 203-MM SHOWER SAMPLE 1931

Direct fire from howitzers of high power artillery reserve of the High Command (ARGK) is not provided for by any shooting rules. But precisely for such shooting, the commander of the 203-mm howitzer battery, Captain I. Vedmedenko, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

On the night of June 9, 1944, on one of the sections of the Leningrad Front, to the noise of a shootout that drowned out the roar of engines, the tractors dragged two huge massive caterpillar guns to the front edge. When everything calmed down, only 1200 m were separated by masked guns from the goal - a giant pillbox. Reinforced concrete walls two meters thick; three floors going underground; armored dome; the approaches covered by the fire of flanking bunkers - it was not without reason that this structure was considered the main node of the enemy’s resistance. And as soon as the dawn came, the howitzers of Vedmedenko opened fire. Within two hours, 100-kilogram concrete-piercing shells destroyed two-meter walls, until finally the enemy fortress ceased to exist ...

“For the first time, direct fire on concrete fortifications from high-powered howitzers of the ARGK, our gunners began in battles with the White Finns in the winter of 1939/1940,” says artillery marshal N. Yakovlev. “And this method of suppressing pillboxes was born not at headquarters, not at academies, and on the front line among soldiers and officers directly serving these wonderful weapons. "

In 1914, the maneuver war, on which the generals expected, lasted only a few months, after which it assumed a positional character. It was then that in the field artillery of the warring powers began to rapidly increase the number of howitzers - guns that, unlike cannons, could hit horizontal targets: destroy field fortifications and shoot at troops hiding behind the terrain.

Howitzer; usually carries mounted fire. The striking effect of a projectile is determined not so much by its kinetic energy at the target as by the amount of explosive contained in it. Lower than the cannon, the initial velocity of the projectile can reduce the pressure of the powder gases and shorten the barrel. As a result, the wall thickness decreases, the recoil force decreases, and the carriage is facilitated. As a result, the howitzer is two to three times lighter than a gun of the same caliber. Another important advantage of the howitzer is that by changing the magnitude of the charge, you can get a bunch of trajectories at a constant angle of elevation. True, the variable charge requires separate charging, which reduces the rate of fire, but this disadvantage is more than compensated by the merits. In the armies of the leading powers, by the end of the war, howitzers accounted for 40-50% of the total artillery fleet.

But the tendency to build powerful field-type defensive structures and a dense network of long-range firing points urgently required heavy guns with increased range, high projectile power and fire rating. In 1931, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Soviet designers created a B-4 domestic howitzer of high power. It began to be designed at the Artkom Design Bureau in 1927, where the work was headed by F. Lender. After his death, the project was transferred to the Bolshevik plant, where Magdesiev was the chief designer, and Gavrilov, Torbin, and others were among the designers.

The B-4 - a 203-mm howitzer of the 1931 model - was intended to destroy particularly strong concrete, reinforced concrete and armored structures, to combat large-caliber or artillery that was covered with strong structures, and to suppress long-range targets.

In order to accelerate the equipping of the Red Army with a new weapon, production was organized simultaneously at two plants. Working drawings in the development process were changed at each plant, adapting to technological capabilities. As a result, almost two different howitzers began to come into service. In 1937, single drawings were worked out not by a design change, but by the layout of individual parts and assemblies already tested in production and operation. The only innovation was the caterpillar. allowing shooting directly from the ground Without special platforms.

The B-4 carriage became the basis for a whole family of high-power guns. In 1939, a series of intermediate samples was completed by the 152-mm Br-19 gun and the 280-mm Br-5 mortar. These works were carried out by a team of designers. factory "Barricade" under the leadership of the Hero of Socialist Labor I. Ivanov.

Thus ended the creation on a single gun carriage of a complex of ground-based high-power guns: guns, howitzers, and mortars. The guns were transported by tractors. For this, the guns were disassembled into two parts: the barrel was removed from the carriage and stacked on a special gun cart, and the carriage connected to the front end made up the carriage.

Of all this complex, the B-4 howitzer was most widely used. The combination of a powerful projectile with a large elevation angle and a variable charge, giving 10 initial speeds, determined its brilliant fighting qualities. For any horizontal targets at a distance of 5 to 18 km, the howitzer could shoot along the trajectory of the most advantageous steepness.

B-4 lived up to its hopes. Having begun her military career on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, she marched on the fronts of World War II, participated in all major artillery bombardments, and the assault on fortresses and large cities.

203 mm howitzer model 1931

Projectile Type:		Primary. speed, m / s
Concrete slaughter
High explosive
Concrete slaughter

  ML-20 152-MM Howitzer Cannon SAMPLE 1937

“When they ask me what kind of artillery shooting makes the highest demands on the art of personnel,” says artillery marshal G. Odintsov, “I reply: counter-battery combat. It is usually fought at long ranges and usually results in a duel with the enemy,” who fires back, threatening the shooter, who has the highest chances to win a duel is the one with the highest skill, more precisely a gun, a more powerful projectile.

The experience of the fronts showed that the best Soviet counter-battery weapon was the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 ML-20 model. "

The history of the creation of the ML-20 dates back to 1932, when a group of designers of the All-Union gun-arsenal association - V. Grabin, N. Komarov and V. Drozdov - proposed creating a powerful 152-mm cannon cannon by superimposing the barrel of the siege 152-mm Schneider gun on the carriage 122 mm guns A-19. Calculations showed that such an idea when installing a muzzle brake, which selects part of the recoil energy, is real. Tests of the prototype confirmed the validity of the technical risk, and the hull 152-mm gun of the 1910/34 model entered service. In the mid-30s, it was decided to modernize this gun. Modernization work was led by a young designer F. Petrov. Having studied the features of the gun carriage A-19, he identified the main disadvantages of this gun: the lack of suspension at the front limited the speed of movement; the lifting-balancing mechanism was difficult to fine-tune and provided insufficiently high speed of vertical aiming; it took a lot of energy and time to transfer the barrel from traveling to combat position and back; the cradle with recoil devices was difficult to manufacture.

Having re-designed the cast upper machine, dividing the combined lifting and balancing mechanism into two independent ones - the sector lifting and balancing, constructing the front with suspension, an sight with an independent aiming line and a cradle with a cast trunnion clip instead of a forged one, the designers created for the first time in world practice an intermediate type tool with properties and guns and howitzers. The elevation angle increased to 65 °, and 13 variable charges made it possible to obtain a gun that, like a howitzer, has hinged trajectories and, like a gun, has high initial projectile speeds.

A. Bulashev, S. Gurenko, M. Burnyshev, A. Ilyin and many others took an active part in the development and creation of howitzer guns.

“The ML-20, developed by us in 1.5 months, was submitted for state tests after the very first 10 shots fired at the factory’s test site,” recalls the winner of the Lenin and State Prizes, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Service, Doctor Petrov Technical Sciences These tests were completed at the beginning of 1937, the gun was put into service and put into serial production the same year, at first everything went well, but suddenly the barrel of one, then another, then the third howitzer guns from shots at low elevation angles, he began to “give a candle" - to spontaneously lift up to the maximum angle. It turned out that for several reasons the worm gear was not self-braking enough. For us, and especially me, this phenomenon caused a lot of trouble until after weary days and sleepless nights it was found a fairly simple solution: We proposed to put a spring-loaded steel disc with a small adjustable clearance in the rifled lid that secures the worm in the crankcase. At the time of the shot, the worm in the end part is in contact with the disk, which, creating a lot of additional friction, prevents the worm from turning.

What a relief I felt when, finding such a solution and quickly sketching out the sketches, I introduced the director and chief engineer of the plant, as well as the head of the military reception. All of them were in the assembly shop that night, which, however, often happened, especially when it came to fulfilling defense orders on a tight schedule. An order was immediately issued to make the details of the device by morning.

When developing this tool, we paid special attention to improving manufacturability and lowering the cost. It was with the production of howitzers-guns in artillery technology that the widespread use of steel shaped casting began. Many of the components - the upper and lower machines, the hinged and trunk parts of the frames, wheel hubs - were made of cheap carbon steel. "

Originally intended to be “reliable artillery, headquarters, institution and field-type operations,” the 152-mm howitzer gun turned out to be a much more flexible, powerful, and effective weapon than previously thought. The combat experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War continuously expanded the range of tasks assigned to this wonderful weapon. And in the Service Guide, published at the end of the war, the ML-20 prescribed the fight against enemy artillery, the suppression of long-range targets, the destruction of pillboxes and powerful bunkers, the fight against tanks and armored trains, and even the destruction of balloons.

During the Great Patriotic War, in all major artillery preparations, in counter-battery combat, in the assault on fortified areas, the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model invariably participated. But a particularly honorable role was played by this weapon in the destruction of heavy fascist tanks. A heavy shell fired at a high initial speed, easily tearing the tower of the "tiger" off the shoulder. There were battles when these towers literally flew in the air with limply hanging gun trunks. And it is no accident that the ML-20 became the basis of the famous ISU-152.

But perhaps the most significant recognition of the excellent qualities of this weapon should be considered that the ML-20 was in service with Soviet artillery not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the postwar years.

  BS-3 100-MM FIELD Cannon SAMPLE 1944

“In the spring of 1943, when Hitler’s tigers, panthers, and ferdinandas began to appear on the battlefield in large numbers,” recalls the famous artillery designer V. Grabin, “I proposed in a note addressed to the Supreme Commander, along with the resumption of production 57-mm anti-tank: ZIS-2 guns, create a new gun - a 100 mm anti-tank gun with a powerful projectile.

Why did we stop at a new 100 mm caliber for ground artillery, and not at the existing 85- and 107-mm guns? The choice was not accidental. We believed that a gun was needed whose muzzle energy would be one and a half times greater than that of a 107-mm gun of the 1940 model. A 100-mm guns have long been successfully used in the Navy, a unitary cartridge was developed for them, while the 107-mm gun had separate loading. The presence of a shot mastered in production played a decisive role, since it takes a very long time to practice it. And we had little time ...

We could not borrow the design of the sea gun: it is too bulky and heavy. Requirements. High power, mobility, lightness, compactness, high rate of fire entailed a number of innovations. First of all, a high-performance muzzle brake was needed. The slit brake previously used had an efficiency of 25-30%. For a 100 mm gun, it was necessary to develop a dual-chamber brake design with an efficiency of 60%. A wedge semi-automatic shutter was used to increase the rate of fire. The layout of the guns was entrusted to the lead designer A. Hvorostin. "

The contours of the guns began to emerge on the Whatman paper during the May holidays of 1943. In a few days, a creative backlog was realized, which developed on the basis of long thoughts, painful searches, the study of combat experience and analysis of the best artillery structures in the world. The barrel and semi-automatic shutter were designed by I. Griban, recoil devices and a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism - F. Kaleganov, a cradle of a molded construction - B. Lasman, an equally strong upper machine V. Shishkin. The issue of choosing a wheel was hard to decide. The design bureau usually used automobile wheels for GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks, but they were not suitable for the new gun. The next car was a five-ton YaAZ, However, its wheel was too heavy and large. Then the idea was born to put twin wheels from GAZ-AA, which allowed to fit into the given weight and dimensions.

A month later, the working drawings were put into production, and another five months later the first prototype of the famous BS-3 came out of the factory’s gates - a gun designed to fight tanks and other motorized means, to combat artillery, to suppress long-range targets, to destroy infantry and live weapons, enemy forces.

“Three design features distinguish the BS-3 from previously developed domestic systems,” says State Prize Laureate A. Hvorostin. “This is a torsion bar suspension, a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism and a carriage made according to the reversed reference triangle. The choice of a torsion bar and a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism was determined requirements for lightness and compactness of nodes, and a change in the gun carriage scheme significantly reduced the load on the frames when firing at maximum angles of rotation of the top About the machine.If in the usual gun carriage schemes each bed was counted on 2/3 of the recoil force of the gun, then in the new scheme the force acting on the bed at any angle of horizontal aiming did not exceed 1/2 of the recoil force. In addition, the new scheme simplified the combat equipment position.

Thanks to all these innovations, BS-3 stood out for its unusually high metal utilization rate. This means that in its design it was possible to achieve the most perfect combination of power and mobility. "

The BS-3 commission was tested under the chairmanship of General Panikhin, a representative: commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army. According to V. Grabin, one of the most interesting moments was shooting at the tiger tank. A cross was drawn with chalk on the tank tower. The gunner received the source data and fired from 1,500 m. Approaching the tank, everyone was convinced: the shell hit almost the cross and pierced the armor. After this, the tests continued according to the given program, and the commission recommended the weapon for arming.

Tests BS-3 have come up with a new method of dealing with heavy tanks. Once at a training ground from a distance of 1,500 m a shot was fired at the captured “ferdinand”. And although, as expected, the shell did not penetrate the 200-mm frontal armor of the self-propelled gun, its gun and control complex failed. BS-Z was able to effectively deal with enemy tanks and self-propelled guns at distances exceeding the direct range of the shot. In this case, as experience has shown, the crew of enemy vehicles was struck by fragments of armor that broke off the hull due to enormous overvoltages occurring in the metal at the time of the projectile's impact on the armor. The manpower that the projectile retained at these ranges was sufficient to bend, distort armor.

In August 1944, when the BS-Z began to arrive at the front, the war was nearing completion, so the experience of the combat use of this weapon was limited. Nevertheless, the BS-3 rightfully occupies an honorable place among the instruments of the Great Patriotic War, because it incorporated ideas that were widely used in artillery structures of the post-war period.

  M-30 122-MM SHOWER SAMPLE 1938

“Wah! On the enemy’s side, a gray cloud shot up. The fifth shell hit the dugout, where the ammunition was stored. A grenade with a fuse set to slow down shot several rounds and exploded inside the warehouse. Following a barely audible sound of a gap, a large black pillar rose high up smoke and tremendous force, the explosion shocked the neighborhood "- this is how P. Kudinov, a former artilleryman, a participant in the war, describes the everyday work of the M-30 famous 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1938 model in the book" Fire is Howitzer ".

Before the First World War, the artillery of the Western powers for the division howitzers adopted the caliber of 105 mm. Russian artillery thought went its own way: the army consisted of 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1910 model. Combat experience has shown that a projectile of this caliber, having the most advantageous fragmentation effect, at the same time gives a minimally satisfactory high-explosive effect. However, in the late 1920s, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 model did not meet the views of specialists on the nature of the future war: it had insufficient range, rate of fire, and mobility.

According to the new "Artillery Arms System for 1929-1932", approved by the Revolutionary Military Council in May 1929, it was envisaged to create a 122-mm howitzer with a stowed weight of 2200 kg, a firing range of 11-12 km and a combat rate of 6 rounds per minute. Since the model developed according to these requirements was too heavy, the modernized 122 mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was kept in service. And some experts began to incline to the idea of \u200b\u200babandoning the 122-mm caliber and adopt a 105-mm howitzer.

“In March 1937, at a meeting in the Kremlin,” recalls Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service F. Petrov, “I spoke about the reality of creating a 122 mm howitzer and, answering numerous questions, gave out what was said, My optimism was fueled by the great, as it seemed to me then, success of our team to create a 152-mm howitzer - ML-20 guns. The meeting outlined a factory (unfortunately, not the one where I worked), which was to develop a prototype. responsibility for everything said At a meeting in the Kremlin, I invited the leadership of my plant to take the initiative in developing a 122-mm howitzer.A small group of designers was organized for this purpose.The very first estimates, which used the existing guns schemes, showed that the task was really difficult. the enthusiasm of the designers - S. Dernov, A. Ilyin, N. Dobrovolsky, A. Chernykh, V. Burylov, A. Drozdov and N. Kostrulin - took their toll: in the autumn of 1937 two projects were defended: developed by the team of V. Sidorenko and ours. Approval was given to our project.

According to the tactical and technical data, primarily on the maneuverability and flexibility of the fire - the ability to quickly transfer fire from one target to another - our howitzer fully met the requirements of the GAU. By its most important characteristic - muzzle energy - it exceeded the howitzer of the 1910/30 model by more than two times. Advantageously, our gun also differed from the 105-mm divisional howitzers of the armies of the capitalist countries.

The estimated weight of the gun is about 2200 kg: 450 kg less than the howitzer developed by the team of V. Sidorenko. By the end of 1938 all tests were completed and the gun was adopted for service under the name of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model. "

The combat wheels were first equipped with a vehicle-type travel brake. The transition from traveling to combat took no more than 1-1.5 minutes. When the beds were extended, the springs were automatically turned off, and the beds themselves were automatically fixed in the extended position. In the stowed position, the barrel was fixed without disconnecting from the rods of recoil devices and without pulling. To simplify and reduce the cost of production in the howitzer, parts and assemblies of existing artillery systems were widely used. So, for example, the bolt was taken from a standard howitzer of the 1910/30 model, the sight from a 152-mm howitzer - guns of the 1937 model, the wheels from the 76 mm divisional gun of the 1936 model, etc. Many parts were manufactured by casting and stamping. That is why the M-30 was one of the simplest and cheapest domestic artillery systems.

A curious fact testifies to the great survivability of this howitzer. Once, during the war, it became known at the factory that there was a gun in the troops that had fired 18 thousand shots. The plant offered to exchange this instance for a new one. And after a thorough factory inspection, it turned out that the howitzer had not lost its qualities and was suitable for further combat use. This conclusion received unexpected confirmation: during the formation of the next echelon, as a sin, a shortage of one gun was discovered. And with the consent of military acceptance, the unique howitzer again went to the front as a newly made weapon.

  M-30 direct fire

The experience of the war showed: M-30 brilliantly performed all the tasks that were prescribed to it. It destroyed and suppressed the enemy’s manpower as in an open area. and located in field-type shelters, it destroyed and suppressed infantry weapons, destroyed field-type structures and fought against artillery and. mortars of the enemy.

But most clearly the dignity of the 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model was manifested in the fact that its capabilities were wider than prescribed by the leadership of the service. -During the days of Moscow’s heroic defense, howitzers were directly targeted by Nazi tanks. Later, experience was secured by the creation of a cumulative projectile for the M-30 and an additional paragraph in the service’s manual: “Howitzer can be used to fight tanks, self-propelled artillery and other armored vehicles of the enemy.”

  See the continuation on the site: WWII - Victory Arms - WWII Artillery Part II

SOVIET ARTILLERY

IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Report 35 pp., 9 fig., 5 tab., 9 sources.

COMBAT APPLICATION OF ARTILLERY, GROUPING OF ARTILLERY, ARTILLERY Offensive, ARTILLERY PREPARATION OF ATTACK

The object of research is the domestic artillery, the history of its development during the Great Patriotic War, the improvement of the material part, forms and methods of its combat use.

The aim of the work was to study experience in solving issues of combat use: maneuvering and massing artillery, grouping and commanding artillery, planning and organizing an artillery attack, organizing anti-tank defense, planning and conducting counter-training during the Great Patriotic War in all types of military operations.

Based on the results of the work, a training manual is being prepared for publication and a report is made at a military scientific conference.

Introduction

2 Artillery Fighting

Conclusion

List of sources used

Introduction

Despite the fundamental transformations that have occurred in the development of weapons, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of combat employment of missile forces and artillery is unthinkable without a thorough study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War played an extremely important role and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. It was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle of Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Terrible fighting qualities were demonstrated by Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery with its fire played a decisive role in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles near Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of World War II. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of the artillery cannonade of hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery support. In defense, the main was anti-tank artillery. It accounts for over 70% of destroyed enemy tanks. The respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the "god of war."

During the years of World War II, our artillery grew quantitatively by 5 times. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the United States - by 1.3 and 3.2 times, England - by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry gave the front 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to deliver devastating fire attacks on the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and military skill of the Soviet gunners in the aggregate ensured victory in this difficult war.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

1 The development of artillery on the eve of and during the Great Patriotic War

1.1 the Development of the material part of artillery

During the prewar five-year periods, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing artillery material, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the angles of fire, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental cannon of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient angle of horizontal fire, it remained the best regimental gun of the time.

In the 1930s, 37-mm and 45-mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of combating all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm gun mod. 1939 (SPM), 122 mm howitzer arr. 1938 (M-30), 152 mm howitzer guns 1937 (ML-20), 203 mm howitzer arr. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

In the prewar years, mortars were re-created. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where the fighting showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

		Organizational affiliation	Firing range, km	Projectile weight kg	Muzzle velocity	Gun weight kg
	45 mm anti-aircraft gun 1937
	76 mm gun 1927
	76 mm gun 1939 g (SPM)
	122 mm howitzer 1938 (M-30)
	152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10)
	107 mm cannon 1940 (M-60)
	122 mm gun 1937 (A-19)
	152 mm howitzer gun 1937 (ML-20)
	152 mm gun 1935 (Br-2)
	203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4)
	210 mm cannon 1939 (Br-17)
	280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5)
	305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18)

So, if during the whole of 1939 1678 82 mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940 5322 of them were fired. At the beginning of the war, mortars of 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm caliber were in service and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 1920s at the Commission of Special Artillery Experiments, the most complete research and experiments began in the 30s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery mounts was adopted.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat mounts was manufactured, in February they switched to their factory production, and on June 21, 1941 a decision was made on the comprehensive development of multiple launch rocket systems and on the immediate deployment of their serial production.

Thus, thanks to the care from the party and government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having, basically, a modern material part of artillery. A number of guns fully met the requirements of wartime, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the availability of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of traction.

By the end of the war, the proportion of anti-tank guns in ground artillery was 14%, for shooting from closed fire positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns were 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50 mm mortars), BM RA - 3%.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army of the first period of the war - 45-mm cannon arr. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its capabilities in the fight against tanks. In 1943, a new system came into service - the 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model ZIS-2. During the Second World War, no army in the world had an anti-tank gun whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

To improve the reservation of enemy tanks, Soviet designers responded by creating a 100-mm field gun of the 1944 BS-3 model. The gun possessed high ballistic data, combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range of 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the original design of the nodes and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm gun mod. In 1927, a new system was introduced, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By superimposing a 76 mm barrel on a carriage, a 45 mm gun arr. 1942 was created regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1943 (r-25).

Since 1942, the armament of the division artillery, instead of the 76-mm guns arr. 1939 (SPM), a new 76-mm arr. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most massive cannon of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of such guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range -13 km. If necessary, a gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from the calculations of ZIS-3 became Heroes of the Soviet Union for winning duels alone with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration in 1943 of the hull command link, it became necessary to have a hull howitzer. Along with the modernization of the samples created in the pre-war period, a hull 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by superimposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) on the carriage of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War, are shown in Table 2.

Based on pre-war developments and the experience of using rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. In the Great Patriotic War, dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used. The most famous are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 was adopted.

The main direction of improving rockets during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the projectile range. The main tactical and technical characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.

Table 2 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

Name	Weight in combat position, kg	Firing range, km	Projectile weight, kg	Muzzle velocity, m / s	Rate of Fire, rds / min
45 mm PTP (M-42) arr. 1942
57-mm PTP (ZIS-2) arr. 1943
76-pl P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942
76 mm P (r-25) arr. 1943
100 mm P (BS-3) arr. 1944
152 mm G (D-1) arr. 1943
160 mm M arr. 1943

During the war, the number of mortars increased almost six times. This is explained by high combat qualities and the ability to provide mass production at lower cost. The 82 mm battalion and 107 mm mountain pack mortars (1943) underwent modernization. The 37 mm and 50 mm mortars were not further developed and were removed from service. 120 mm regimental mortar arr. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also modernized. The result is a system that is still with minor improvements in the combat formation. In 1944, a 160 mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was charged from the breech.

Table 3 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Type of shells
Adoption time						January 1943	April 1944		April 1944	October 1944
Caliber mm
Weight BB, kg
Table range, max., M
Range deviation at max. range, m
Direction deviation at max. Range, m

Self-propelled artillery received its development, in essence, only during the war years. At the end of 1942 a light self-propelled gun SU-76 was adopted, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 gun. The gun was located in the open on top and behind the armored wheelhouse. It was first used in battles in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, the launch of the SU-122 self-propelled guns began on the basis of the T-34; from August 1943, the average SU-85 entered the battle with enemy tanks, which at the end of 1944 was replaced by the new SU-100.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed "St. John's Wort", were created in 1944 on the basis of the heavy tank IS-2. There are known cases when ISU-152 shells tore down towers from heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to escort all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, perfectly demonstrating their fighting qualities during the assault on Koenigsberg forts and during street battles in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was removed from the subordination of the Red Army Artillery Commander and subordinated to the Commander of the armored and mechanized forces, in combat use it was equated to tanks and is not considered in this work later on.

1.2 the development of the organization of artillery

The development of organizational forms of Soviet artillery took place depending on the economic capabilities of the country and the specific conditions of the war. Two stages can be noted in the development of artillery organization. At the first stage, which coincides with the first period of World War II, organizational forms adapted to the conditions of defense and the material capabilities of the state. The transition of the Soviet Army from defense to offensive operations laid the foundation for the second stage in the development of the organization of artillery. Naturally, at each stage, our ability to provide troops with the material part was a decisive factor.

During the war, organizational changes took place both in the military artillery and in the artillery of the RVGK. At the very beginning of the war, an imbalance between the artillery of the military and the RVGK was revealed. Their specific gravity was 5 and 95%. This was, as before, the result of ideas about the purely maneuverable nature of a future war. The error had to be fixed urgently.

Already in July 1941, due to the weakening of the artillery of rifle formations, the artillery of the RVGK was strengthened. She could maneuver, massaging artillery in the main directions. Thus, the overall degree of using the capabilities of the military branch in operations increased. In general, the artillery of the RVGK was most developed, especially with the transition of the Red Army to strategic offensive operations. By the end of the war, its share increased to 50%. By the way, measures in the Wehrmacht to increase the artillery of the RGK were taken too late, and its specific gravity did not exceed 18%.

Military artillery developed evolutionarily. Its basis was the regular artillery of rifle divisions. Corps artillery existed at the beginning of the war, in 1941 it was transferred to the artillery of the RVGK, and with the restoration of the corps appeared again. There was no army artillery before the war and at the beginning of the war, it began to be created in the spring of 1943.

The staff of the rifle division during the war years changed 6 times. During the war, artillery divisions intensified mainly due to mortars. The main staff was established in December 1942. Fundamental changes relate to divisional artillery. So, in July 1941, the second (howitzer) artillery regiment was withdrawn, and at the end of 1944 the artillery brigade of the three-regiment composition (including the regiment of 160 mm mortars) was included in the staff of the Guards Rifle Division, the anti-aircraft division, the self-propelled division installations, anti-tank division (armed with 76-mm guns). The number of guns and mortars in the division increased to 282.

In the rifle corps in the state of 1943 there was a corps artillery regiment. Since December 1944, the Guards Rifle Corps usually had two artillery regiments or an artillery brigade of two-regiment composition.

In April 1943, army artillery appeared in the combined-arms army: cannon and anti-tank artillery regiments, mortar regiment. In 1944, in the armies on the basis of cannon regiments, cannon artillery brigades of two-regiment composition began to be created.

Particularly rapidly growing artillery RVGK. Its number increased primarily due to light artillery and mortars. In total, during the war years, the number of mortars in the artillery of the RVGK increased 17 times, guns - 5 times. Therefore, the artillery of the RVGK was, first of all, a means of quantitatively strengthening the artillery of combined arms and associations in the main areas

In the artillery of the RVGK, the number of individual units continuously increased, especially in 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, it consisted of 199 cannon regiments, 196 howitzer, 240 anti-tank, 256 anti-aircraft, 138 jet, and 83 mortar. This led to a sharp increase in the number of reinforcement artillery in the composition of the fronts. Even in the defensive operation near Stalingrad, some fronts had up to 70 reinforcement regiments. To manage such a mass of artillery and quickly create the necessary groupings, it was necessary to form a fundamentally new artillery formations of the RVGK - artillery and guards mortar (rocket artillery) divisions, artillery breakthrough corps. Along with them there were separate artillery, mortar and guards mortar brigades. To make massive use of artillery forces and means in the fight against tanks, fighter anti-tank regiments and brigades were created in the artillery of the RVGK.

The first artillery divisions created in the fall of 1942 were eight-regiment (two cannon, three howitzer and three anti-tank, a total of 168 guns). Since 1943, artillery divisions of brigade personnel were created, as well as artillery breakthrough corps. The breakthrough artillery division included six brigades (light, howitzer — all three regiments each, a cannon — two regiments, heavy howitzer and howitzer large power; 356 guns and mortars in total), in 1944 the division included seven brigades.

In the summer of 1941, instead of 72-gun brigades, anti-tank artillery began to create 16, 20, 36-gun regiments armed with 37, 45, 76 or 85-mm guns. Since July 1942, all anti-tank artillery was renamed fighter-anti-tank, and the regiments received a single organization organization (5 batteries, 20 guns). In 1943, a more expedient form of organization was found - the anti-tank artillery brigade. She had three regiments (60 guns) of caliber 45, 57 and 76 mm. In 1945, the brigades were partially re-equipped with 100 mm cannons.

The creation of large artillery formations was a new moment in the organization of artillery. They became in the hands of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a powerful means of quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the artillery of the fronts and armies operating in the direction of the main attack. With their creation, the possibilities of massing artillery and maneuver by its large masses in battle and operation increased. It was at the expense of it that it became possible to create artillery groups at all levels, from regiment to army. This harmonious system of artillery groups lasted more than 50 years.

1.3 the Development of the combat use of artillery in offensive and defensive operations

In the first major offensive operations of the Red Army in late 1941- early 1942 serious shortcomings were identified in the combat use of artillery, in the organization and conduct of the offensive by associations and formations. So, in a counterattack near Moscow, artillery was relatively evenly distributed in the bands of the advancing armies, which did not allow to achieve fire superiority over the enemy.

One of the main requirements of the Supreme High Command Headquarters was a decisive concentration of forces and assets in the area of \u200b\u200bthe proposed breakthrough. Gradually, the maneuver and massing of artillery outgrew the tactical framework and was carried out on an operational, and even strategic, scale.

Already in the second half of 1942, there was an increase in the number of artillery in areas of breakthrough of associations (formations) and an increase in the degree of massing, which is characterized by the width of these sections and the number of guns, mortars and rocket artillery on them.

The following operational densities were created in offensive operations at breakthrough areas: in 1941-1942. - up to 70-80; in 1943 - up to 130-200; in 1944 - up to 150-250; in 1945 - 250-300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough site.

The decisiveness of the mass is evidenced by the fact that, with the width of the breakthrough sections making up 10-15% of the total length of the front line, up to 80-90% of all artillery was concentrated on them.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of artillery as a kind of army during the war, the increased scale of maneuver and massing of artillery in the main directions of formations and associations in battles and operations forced us to look for new forms of its combat use.

The basis of the combat use of artillery is the distribution of its forces (formations) and the choice of forms and methods of fire destruction of the enemy.

Until 1944, i.e. before the saturation of the troops with artillery of the RVGK, artillery groups were created by the nature of the tasks performed, i.e. on a targeted basis.

The grouping of artillery in this period is very diverse: support groups for infantry (AP), long-range (DD), artillery of destruction (AR), guards mortar units (GMS), direct-fire guns (SPG) and others. The development of the grouping is shown in Table 4.

In 1944, an artillery grouping system was developed, created by the organizational-tactical principle. In special instructions approved by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, the most expedient artillery grouping, corresponding to the nature of modern combat and operation, was determined. It provided for the creation of a regiment artillery group (PAG) in a regiment, a division artillery group (DAG) in a division, a corps artillery group (KAG) in the corps, and an army artillery group (AAG) in the army.

Artillery groups created in combined-arms formations from regiment to army were intended to solve problems in the interests of these formations. For example, the PAG supported infantry battalions, fought with mortars, and sometimes with enemy artillery. With the development of the offensive, part of the artillery from the regimental group was reassigned to the commanders of battalions of the first echelon, which ensured closer interaction of artillery with combined arms units with the development of combat in depth and increased the independence of the advanced regiments.

For divisional artillery groups, the main targets for defeat were enemy artillery and reserves. In addition, according to the decision of the division commander, in the most critical periods of the battle, the division group was wholly or partially involved to strengthen the fire of regimental artillery groups, especially when breaking through the defense of battalions of the first echelon of the enemy, repelling counterattacks of his brigade (division) reserves, and breaking through the intermediate defense lines in depth, etc.

An army (corps) artillery group, created to solve problems in the interests of the main grouping of the army (corps), was able to wage a successful battle with enemy artillery, defeat its reserves in areas of concentration, on the march and when deployed, disrupt enemy control, intensify artillery fire First-tier divisions and support the entry into the battle of second-tier divisions.

Depending on the situation, sometimes the army (corps) artillery group, by decision of the army commander (corps commander), was divided into subgroups of divisions operating in the main direction. Along with the AAG, a group of GMPs (Guards Mortar Units) was later created in the army, later called the Army Group of Reactive Artillery (AGRA).

To destroy the erupted enemy tank groups in the armies, corps and divisions, artillery anti-tank reserves (APTrez) were created.

The new artillery group had fundamental differences from the previously created. Groups were to be created at all levels of the combined arms command and report directly to the combined arms commander. The groups became an organic part of the combined arms battle order and the operational formation of troops. During the battle and operation, they did not disintegrate, but only could change their composition, supporting units and formations at all stages of the battle and operation.

The unification of artillery into artillery groups ensured the possibility of massive use of artillery assets by the respective artillery commanders and the continuity of artillery interaction with infantry and tanks for the entire period of the battle. First of all, the effectiveness of enemy fire destruction by artillery increased.

The beginning of a new stage in the development of the combat use of artillery, primarily the enemy’s fire defeat, was a letter from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated January 10, 1942 No. 03 about an artillery attack.

Its essence was reduced to three basic requirements, without which it is impossible to count on the success of the offensive; this is a decisive massing of means and forces on the breakthrough site, the continuity of artillery support for the offensive, and the organic combination of fire and attack by the advancing troops.

“Artillery should not act randomly,” the directive said, “but with concentration, and it should not be concentrated anywhere in the front, but in the area of \u200b\u200baction of the army’s strike group, the front. ... In order to make artillery support real, and the infantry attack effective, it is necessary to transfer from the practice of artillery preparation to the practice of artillery attack. ... Artillery cannot be limited to one-time operations within an hour or two hours before the offensive, but must advance along with infantry, must fire at short breaks all the time of the offensive, until the enemy’s defensive line is cracked to the full depth. ”

The first artillery attack was carried out in January 1942 in the offensive zone of the 20th Army of the Western Front when breaking through the enemy’s defense on the river. Lama And in full in the operation of a group of fronts, it was carried out in November 1942 in a counterattack near Stalingrad. In subsequent years, all issues of the artillery attack developed and improved.

The artillery attack was divided into three periods - artillery preparation, artillery support for the attack, and artillery support with infantry and tank fires in the depths of battle.

Artillery attack preparation (APA) was planned in all cases in the most detail. Its duration and construction depended on specific conditions and significantly differed from one another, which is presented in Table 5. This allowed us to avoid a pattern that could lead to the loss of tactical surprise. The achievement of tactical surprise also determined the desire to conduct a relatively short APA.

The duration of the artillery preparation of the attack, as a rule, was 1-2 hours. But depending on the specific conditions, the APAs were planned to be both longer and shorter. So, the longest APA was in the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation of the Karelian Front in 1944 - 3 hours 32 minutes (including 30 minutes of firing control), three-hour artillery preparation for the attack was carried out during the storming of the Konigsberg fortress. The shortest artillery preparation was in the 5th shock army in the Berlin operation - 20 minutes. Towards the end of the war, in view of the increase in the number of artillery involved, they sought to reduce the duration of artillery preparation to 40-20 minutes.

The main content of the APA was the massive artillery attacks on the entire tactical depth of enemy defense. At the same time, depending on the nature of the enemy’s defense (increasing depth, separation of battle formations, transition to trench, multi-position defense), as well as on the number of artillery involved, the depth of simultaneous suppression of defense objects changed. So, in 1941-1942, when the enemy’s defense was focal and shallow, massive artillery fire was conducted mainly at a depth of 1.5-2.5 km and on artillery batteries. In 1943, when the Nazi troops moved to the trench defense and the depth of its main strip increased, the massive artillery fire led to a depth of 3-4 km or more, in 1944 - to 6-8 km and in 1945. - up to 8-10 km.

The artillery preparation began, as a rule, with a sudden powerful fire attack, which was achieved in a short time by inflicting maximum losses on the enemy who did not manage to escape, and was directed, first of all, against manpower and firepower at strong points of the first line or in the first trench. By the end of the war, the duration of the first fire raids increased compared with 1941-1943. from 3-5 to 10-15 minutes

In order to reduce artillery training, particularly strong structures were destroyed in a few days or on the eve of the offensive. For example, in the Krasnoselskaya and Vyborg operations of the Leningrad Front, the period of destruction was one day; during the storming of Konigsberg by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the period of opening and destruction was four days; during the Crimean operation by the 4th Ukrainian Front - two days.

Conducting (since 1942) on the eve of or on the day of the onset of reconnaissance by the forces of advanced battalions or reconnaissance units required partial re-planning at a limited time of the initial version of the artillery attack. In this regard, in 1945, advance planning was practiced for several options for artillery preparation and support for the attack, depending on the actions of the advanced battalions. Thus, the gap between the end of the battle of the advanced battalions and the introduction of the main forces into the battle was closed.

The artillery preparation ended with a powerful fire raid lasting 5-10 minutes (1941-1943) or 15-25 minutes (1944-1945).

The firing raid, which ended the artillery preparation of the attack, was planned to be powerful and was conducted with an increase to the ultimate fire regime. By its power and character, it, in fact, did not differ from artillery fire at the beginning of the artillery support of the attack. This sought to eliminate the marked transition from artillery preparation to support the attack. As a rule, one of the firing raids on the artillery and mortar batteries of the enemy blocked the moment of the end of artillery preparation and the start of artillery support. Consequently, the enemy’s batteries were exposed to heavy fire at the most crucial moment, when the infantry and tanks launched an attack.

In a number of cases, to deceive the enemy, false fire transfers were successfully used, which, if well organized (with a simultaneous demonstration of the attack), gave good results. However, the complexity of their implementation and the lengthening of the period of artillery preparation forced to abandon the false transfers of fire.

Artillery support for the attack was carried out, as a rule, to the depth of defense of the regiments of the first echelon, and the method of its implementation depended on the nature of the enemy’s defense. The main methods were the consistent concentration of fire, a single fire shaft and their combination. In addition, the artillerymen of the 1st Belorussian Front developed and used for the first time in the Belarusian operation of 1944 a double fire shaft. Other varieties of attack support methods were used: an increasing fire shaft, a creeping method, combing fire, a mortar fire shaft, etc.

Using various combinations of types of fire, massively attracting artillery, it was possible to achieve success. For example, in the Oryol offensive operation, artillery support for the attack in all armies was planned differently. So, the following method of artillery support for the attack was chosen in the 11th Guards Army: a combing artillery fire was prepared along the lines every 100 meters to a depth of 500-700 m. Further infantry and tanks support (with disruption of the attack course) was carried out by the PSO method to a depth of 3000 m 5–6 divisions were concentrated on each stronghold or center of resistance occupied by forces before the battalion. Fire for each object took 5-10 minutes, and with repeated attacks - up to 15 minutes.

The depth of artillery support for the attack grew and by the end of the war reached 3-4 km. At the same time, Soviet artillery successfully coped with the task of organizing support for the attack of infantry and tanks at night (Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front).

In the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, great experience was gained in the implementation of the third period of the artillery attack - escorting infantry and tanks during combat in the depths of the enemy’s defense.

In-depth fire support was based on the principle of continuity of artillery interaction with infantry and tanks. It was achieved by strengthening infantry units with direct escort weapons, separating artillery spotters into tanks, by creating artillery groups capable of providing fire support to infantry at any time, and by massaging artillery and its fire in a timely manner in the main areas of attack.

The infantry and tanks were escorted during the battle in the depths of the enemy’s defense, accompanied by fire and wheels, and carried out concentrated fire of divisions, individual batteries and guns against targets that prevented advancement. To directly support the compounds in the depths of the battle, they were given anti-aircraft artillery units, fighter-anti-tank regiments with mechanical traction, and when they entered the breakthrough, they partly regained part of howitzer regiments and reactive artillery regiments. To repulse enemy counterattacks and deliver fire strikes at resistance nodes, artillery attached to mobile units was successfully used. She followed the composition of the columns of tank and rifle formations closer to their head, which made it possible to quickly bring artillery into action. Detailed planning of the third period of the artillery attack was first carried out in a counter-offensive operation near Stalingrad.

One of the important problems of the use of artillery in the war was the organization of the fight against enemy artillery. Counter-battery combat was usually planned depending on the situation with the artillery headquarters of the corps, the army and, more rarely, the front. The main purpose of counter-battery control was to suppress batteries. On the Leningrad Front, the destruction of enemy artillery batteries was also used. In offensive operations, the struggle with enemy artillery was usually assigned to long-range groups and began simultaneously with the artillery preparation of the attack. In detail, it was planned for the first two periods of the artillery attack.

The organization of counter-mortar warfare proved to be a more difficult problem, mainly because of the difficulties of exploring mortar batteries. Since the fight against mortars had its own specifics, special divisional and corps counter-mortar groups were created for its conduct, which consisted mainly of howitzer and mortar units.

The development of the combat use of artillery in defense took place in close connection with the development of forms and methods of conducting defensive battles and operations. Experience has shown that the importance of artillery in defense has steadily increased. The main tasks solved by artillery were the fight against enemy artillery, its tanks, the rout of the advancing groupings, and the covering of military formations of troops from the air.

The difficult conditions in which the war began, the forced retreat of the Soviet troops, heavy casualties in people and military equipment (including artillery), the need to conduct defense in wide bands caused a number of shortcomings in the combat use of artillery in the first period of the war (especially in the summer autumn campaign of 1941). The most serious shortcomings include: even distribution of artillery between divisions and divisions on the entire front of defense (including anti-tank artillery); insufficient organization of a wide and flexible maneuver by artillery means (especially in combat operations in the summer of 1941). But, despite the shortcomings that took place, artillery was crucial in the defeat of the advancing enemy groups.

Due to the heavy losses that the enemy suffered from the blows of our troops, he was forced to abandon the offensive in several directions and focus his efforts on one. This further raised the problem of organizing maneuver. Meanwhile, it could be successfully carried out only if the troops held the defensive lines occupied, forestalling the enemy in concentrating additional forces and means.

Under these conditions, the task of artillery, especially the army, was to support the infantry while holding its defensive positions and to timely build up artillery assets at the expense of the artillery of the RVGK. The main command took all measures to concentrate the maximum amount of artillery to defeat the main enemy groups. With an increase in the number of artillery, the possibilities for operational and tactical maneuver by artillery in defense also increased.

An example of decisive artillery maneuvers in defense is the concentration of up to 50% of all the artillery of the RVGK in the western front lines of operations in the fall of 1941. The same picture is in the southwest and Stalingrad directions. So, in the summer of 1942, there were only 4,282 guns in the Stalingrad direction, and by the end of the defensive operations their number had increased to 12,000. Military artillery also took part in the maneuver.

As a result of the maneuver, artillery densities in defense increased. The operational density of artillery in operations in the main directions reaches 50-80, and in secondary directions - 15-20 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. In the defensive operation of the 13th Army of the Central Front near Kursk in 1943, the density of artillery reached 105 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (this was the highest density of artillery in defense during the war).

The artillery grouping in defense did not qualitatively differ from its grouping in the offensive, but the artillery groups had less artillery than in the offensive. However, there were exceptions. In 1942, during the period of defensive operations near Stalingrad, a front-line artillery group was created for the first time. In those specific conditions, when the most important task of the front was to maintain a large city, the creation of such a group fully paid off. In defensive operations near Leningrad, experience was gained in creating a front-line artillery group for counter-battery combat. Its basis was the 3rd Leningrad counter-battery artillery corps.

When creating an artillery grouping, as well as in an offensive, the need emerged to have artillery groups in the hands of each combined arms commander. In addition, the defense provided for the creation of various artillery reserves (anti-tank and general).

The artillery fire system was built to the entire depth of defense. The basis of the fire system was artillery and mortar fire from closed fire positions, combined with direct-fire gun fire and machine gun fire. The artillery fire system included: long-range fire attacks, concentrated fire, mobile barrage fire, motionless barrage fire, direct-fire gun fire.

A special place in the enemy’s fire defeat in the defense was occupied by artillery counter-training (AKP). The AKP was prepared in the presence of sufficient artillery and time to prepare the fire system and was carried out on an army (and sometimes front) scale. In the fall of 1941, it was conducted in the armies of the North-Western and Western fronts, in September-October 1942 - in the armies of the Stalingrad front, in 1943 - on the Central and Voronezh fronts near Kursk and in other defensive operations of the war.

So, powerful automatic transmissions, with the aim of disrupting the enemy’s prepared attack on Leningrad, were carried out on September 12 and 21 in the 42nd Army’s range of operations. Their duration ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. More than four artillery regiments were involved, as well as artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and coastal artillery. They fully achieved their goal, the enemy attacks began scattered and did not succeed.

In a defensive battle near Moscow, the command of the Western Front provided for the carrying out of artillery counter-training in the action bands of 20, 16 and 19 armies. The AKP was planned according to four options, depending on the possible directions of enemy attacks, up to 300 guns were involved. Enemy attacks in the center of the Western Front were weakened by artillery counter-training and were unsuccessful.

The defensive battle near Kursk began with a powerful artillery counter-preparation, which preempted the start of the enemy offensive by 10 minutes. The AKP was planned in advance on the scale of the Central and Voronezh fronts in several ways. The average density of artillery was 30 guns and mortars and 3 rocket launchers per 1 km. In the most important areas, the density reached 60-70 guns and mortars. The duration of the counter-training is 30 minutes. Powerful artillery fire strikes were unexpected for the enemy, as a result, the enemy began his artillery preparation with a delay of 2 hours, disorganized and fragmented. The first blow of the enemy was significantly weakened, his troops still suffered losses in the initial position, were upset and demoralized. In total, 0.5 combat ammunition was used up for artillery counter-training.

In the organization and conduct of artillery counter-training, there is a noticeable tendency to increase the number of artillery used in it, which significantly increased the effectiveness of counter-training.

The anti-tank defense was greatly developed during the war. Before the war, it was seen as a combination of the fire of individual direct-fire guns on individual tanks and concentrated fire from closed fire positions on groups of tanks in the areas of their accumulation or during movement and attack. The creation of anti-tank missiles was also envisaged, and in the event of tanks breaking into the area of \u200b\u200bthe main artillery firing positions, direct fire was fired by batteries in closed firing positions.

However, at the beginning of the war, significant shortcomings were revealed in the organization of anti-tank defense, the most important were: the lack of proper artillery interaction with other means of combat (with tanks), underestimation of engineering barriers and obstacles, insufficient density of anti-tank artillery and its uniform distribution along the front; shallow depth of anti-tank defense; artillery from closed firing positions fought tanks only occasionally.

Taking these shortcomings into account, the Red Army artillery headquarters in July 1941 developed for the troops "Instructions for the organization of an artillery fire defense system." Here the demand was put forward - to counter the massive use of enemy tanks with the massive use of anti-tank weapons and, above all, artillery.

Ultimately, these problems were resolved by developing an anti-tank defense system, which is a system of anti-tank strong points and areas, as well as anti-tank reserves.

Anti-tank strongholds created by artillery weapons merged with the strongholds of the infantry, representing a single system of combined arms defense. This gave them greater stability in the fight against enemy tanks, with assault rifles on tanks and with infantry advancing behind the tanks. For greater stability, the defense of the individual strong points between them organized close interaction along the front and depth, and the fire of the strong points was linked into a single interacting system, first on the scale of divisions, then corps, armies and, finally, the front.

Areas occupied only by artillery and prepared to fight tanks with direct fire, became known as anti-tank areas. They were created, as a rule, in the depths of defense

An even more robust anti-tank defense system was developed in 1944. Since that time, it included company anti-tank strongholds, combined into battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas (as part of anti-tank artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations), artillery and anti-tank reserves. The role in the fight against artillery tanks, which occupied closed fire positions, was increasingly increasing. It was now located in tank-dangerous directions and fired heavily at enemy tank groups, and with the breakthrough of tanks into the depths of defense, it hit them with direct fire.

Gradually, an insurmountable anti-tank defense was developed and created in the tactical and operational combat zones. Already in the defensive period near Stalingrad, this system was quite perfect, but its classical expression was the anti-tank defense system in the battle of Kursk.

New in anti-tank artillery defense was the gradual development of tactics for the combat use of artillery and anti-tank reserves. At first they were allocated in the armies, divisions, then on the fronts. In the operational zone, artillery and anti-tank reserves were allocated for each (or two adjacent) directions. Hence the need arose for organizing interaction between them and other reserves of divisions, corps, armies and fronts, as well as between them and the system of anti-tank strong points and areas formed by the troops of the first echelons.

The developed anti-tank defense system proved its vitality - it turned out to be insurmountable for enemy tank groups.

2 MILITARY ACTIONS OF ARTILLERY

2.1 Guidance of artillery of the Soviet Army

In July 1941, the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army was reinstated, to which Colonel-General of Artillery N. N. Voronov was appointed and the Main Directorate of Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was formed. Its structure included the headquarters, the combat training department of ground and military anti-aircraft artillery, the inspector, the personnel department and several departments.

The Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA), working under the direct leadership of the GKO and the Supreme Command, as well as in close contact with the Headquarters of the Rear of the Red Army, was engaged in providing the army with armament and ammunition. At industrial enterprises there were military representatives responsible for the quality of weapons and ammunition entering the troops. GAU KA also carried out maintenance, evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment. To solve these problems, the GAU KA created the Artillery Supply Department, the Artillery Operation Management Department, the Artillery Repair Department, the Tractor Administration and others.

On November 8, 1942, an order was issued by the NPO to enhance the role of artillery commanders in guiding the combat activities of artillery. The commanders of the artillery of the Red Army, front, army, respectively, became commanders of the artillery of the Red Army, front, army, corps. The commander of the artillery of the Red Army was simultaneously deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

The GKO decree of April 29, 1943 guards mortar units were subordinate to the commander of artillery of the Red Army. The commander of the GMP became the deputy commander of artillery of the Red Army for the guards mortar units. Artillery Major General P. A. Degtyarev was approved for this position. The full unification of the GMP with artillery contributed to a clearer planning of the engagement of the enemy and their more appropriate combat use, taking into account the fire capabilities of artillery.

The same decree of the State Defense Committee, under the commander of artillery of the Red Army, created a Military Council consisting of Colonel-General of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, Major General of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev, L. M. Gaidukov and I. S. Prochko.

Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov was the Commander of the Artillery of the Red Army, the Commander of the Air Defense of the country and was a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on many fronts of World War II.

At the very beginning of the war, he personally developed and submitted to the State Defense Committee specific proposals on the organization of anti-tank defense. N.N. Voronov was the author of a new, more advanced artillery structure, which provided for the creation of artillery brigades and divisions of the RVGK, and then the breakthrough artillery corps. Under his direct leadership, methods were developed for the combat use of rocket artillery, as well as a letter from the Supreme Command of the Supreme Command on the artillery attack.

Under his leadership, the headquarters of the artillery, which was headed by Colonel-General of the Artillery F. A Samsonov throughout the war, developed and introduced new methods of combat use of artillery into the troops, methods of controlling concentrated, massive and accompanying fire. So, summarizing the first experience of using a double fire shaft on an operational scale, NN Voronov issued instructions on the organization and development of it by all artillery commanders and headquarters.

N.N. Voronov rendered great and effective assistance to the chiefs of artillery fronts in the development and implementation of plans for an artillery attack. During the liquidation of the enemy’s encircled group near Stalingrad, being the Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters at the Don Front, he participated in the organization of an artillery attack in which for the first time in the practice of World War II a fire shaft was used to a depth of 1.5 km.

January 18, 1943 N. N. Voronov, the first in the Soviet Armed Forces, was awarded the title of Marshal of Artillery.

2.2 The feats of arms of the gunners

The success of the artillery combat operations was determined not only by the presence of the modern material part, but also by its skillful use, the heroism of the artillerymen, and the high combat and moral qualities of the entire personnel of our artillery.

The special merits of artillery to the Fatherland were marked by the assignment to a number of its units and formations of honorary titles, primarily the guards. The first in artillery became the guards in January 1942, eight regiments, distinguished themselves in the battle of Moscow. Over the years of the war, six artillery divisions, 7 rocket artillery divisions, 11 anti-tank brigades, 64 artillery regiments and others were awarded this title. More than 2100 artillery formations and units were awarded military orders.

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The development of artillery after the Second World War as formations, units and subunits armed with guns, mortars, rocket launchers and anti-tank shells, reconnaissance, communications, traction, transport and fire control devices.

Consider its effectiveness and the effectiveness of armored forces clearly. Taking the most accurate performance criterion as the reporting point, the number of enemy soldiers destroyed.

I am not going to calculate the number of tanks, guns and mortars that took part in battles up to one. It is not necessary. We are interested in the order of numbers.

To avoid screaming, we will take the initial figures as the most kosher from the tables of reference work:

Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU
Institute of General History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences of the USSR
STORY
SECOND WORLD WAR
1939-1945
Order of the Red Banner of Labor
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Moscow.

  And we will not even look closely at them, although honestly I really want to. Ask what and how in these tables were considered.

The largest German artillery system, the 75 mm anti-tank gun PAK.40, was produced from 1942 to 1945, a total of 23,303 units were released (2114, 8740, 11728 and 721, respectively. All figures are for Shirokorad).

The most common Wehrmacht howitzer, the cornerstone of divisional artillery - 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 (in all versions) was released during WWII in the number of 18,432 units (from 1939 - 483, 1380, 1160, 1249, 4103, 9033, 1024).

A approximately comparable number was released 8.8 cm FlaK anti-aircraft guns 18/36/37.

We will not trifle. As a basis for calculations, we take tables No. 6 and No. 11 above, with general data.

About corrections to tables.

As we know, the allies delivered tanks and artillery according to Lendliz and in rather large quantities. We neglect these figures and count them for the post-war production of tables.
  We also recall that in the Red Army and Navy at the beginning of the war there were 117581 artillery systems and almost 26,000 tanks, we will reset these numbers to offset the armaments of the districts, the Far Eastern Front and other little things of life that were not involved in the war. On the German side, we will balance the trophy weapons of the countries captured by Hitler and the entire release of weapons and military equipment until 1940 inclusive. In general, we will calculate the effectiveness based on the release of 1941-1945.

We consider (Germany-USSR):
Artillery (all in thousand pieces):
1941: 22.1 - 30.2; 1942 40.5-127.1; 1943 73.7-130.3; 1944 148.2 -122.4; 1945 27 - 72.2.
Mortars:
1941: 4.2 - 42.4; 1942, 9.8 - 230; 1943 g. 23 - 69.4; 1944, 33.2 -7.1; 1945, 2.8 - 3.
Tanks (SPGs):
  1941: 3.8-4.8; 1942, 6.2-24.4; 1943 10.7-24.1; 1944 18.3-29; 1945 4.4 - 20.5.
Total:
Artillery:
311,5 - 482,2
Mortars:
73 - 351,9
Tanks (SPGs):
43,4 - 102,8
Or:
427,9 - 936,9 .

In general, the USSR produced tanks, guns and mortars more than double that of Germany. But that's not all! As my readers probably know, the USSR fought with Germany far from alone. And whether anyone likes it or not, Hitler’s losses on the Western Front (equating West Africa to him) are about a third of the total during WWII.

Since this material will spoil a lot of chairs at the Internet polls, I’ll be kind, we assume that although a quarter of the total number of mentioned weapons and military equipment was involved in the West.

3/4 from 427.9, this is approximately 321 thousand tanks, artillery systems and mortarswho killed the Red Army and 936,9   killed the Wehrmacht soldiers.

Round the numbers to 320 000   and 930 000   accordingly, for simplicity of further calculations. Even 350 000   and 900 000 . Recall the allies of the Reich.

Now we find out how many whom each other's military managed to kill..

Regarding the losses of the Soviet Union, curious people can go to reference   and get acquainted with the calculations a little so refuting Grigory Fedotovich Krivosheev, with the same as his source.

I must say that shadow_ru far from alone and the mistakes of the "Vulture ..." with calculations in the balance of the recruits, with a giggle (already) have been lurking among people interested in the issue since at least 2006. In general, everyone who needs to know about these more than 2 million fighters, but this is of no interest to anyone in power.

Total reliable figure of the irretrievable demographic losses of the USSR Armed Forces (calculated by the balance method without Krivosheevsky-errors with balance) - 11 405 thousand people.

With the loss of the enemy in the "Neck ..." is also a very funny situation, for example result of viewing the latest edition. It’s just aerobatics, to recognize the figures of the German researcher Rüdiger Overmans as kosher and begin to reduce a new balance like this:

"After 2000, German scientists led by historian Professor Rüdiger Overmans carried out many years of work on a thorough analysis of reporting and statistical documents stored in German archives. The study found that the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 5 million 300 thousand soldiers and officers. This information is published in the book "German military losses in the Second World War", Munich.
Taking into account the results of a study by German scientists, the authors of this work made corresponding corrections to the previously available information about the irretrievable losses of the countries of the fascist bloc on the Soviet-German front. They are reflected in the table. 94".

Tab. 94 corresponds to the table. 201 editions of "Russia and the USSR ..." and instead of 3,604.8 thousand people who died, died from wounds, etc., became 5,300 thousand.

Further, the authors conclude that the ratio of irretrievable losses was 1: 1.1 (previously 1: 1.3).
  Megaperedger, you will not say anything. At Overmans, this number is the total number of those killed, deceased and dead on all fronts, as well as in captivity.

In this situation, if Grigory Fedotovich was again a little mistaken for 2 million people, it’s logical to turn to the figures recognized by him as reliable, directly. So to speak, without intermediaries:

Roughly, the Wehrmacht and SS troops lost 3.55 million people in the East who died in battle and died in captivity.
The ratio of 11.405 million against 3.55 is certainly unpleasant, but we must not forget that about 3.9 million Soviet troops died in captivity. Overmans can only be convinced that only post-war mortality is highlighted, but this is normal, in the first half of the war the Germans were able to capture extremely poorly, respectively, their rabid mortality was quite comparable to that in the German airspace camps in the same period, later, when the attitude towards them was corrected didn't really matter. Let us accept the total number of Germans who died in Soviet captivity at 205,000 people. Too lazy to look for the exact number.

In general, the mortality figures of 46, 47 and subsequent years are practically the only one of the Soviet Union, the Allies dismissed the bulk of the Boshs by homes by the end of 1945.

As a result, on the Eastern Front, approximately 7.5 million Soviet soldiers and approximately 3.7 million servicemen of Germany and its allies died directly in battles (130,000 Romanians, 195,000 Hungarians, 58,000 Finns - I don’t know how G.F. 682 000, I do not think that the remaining are Slovaks)

And now we consider the effectiveness.
Not so long ago, a book by Christophe Russ published "Human Material. German Soldiers on the Eastern Front" (M., Veche, 2013, ISBN 978-5-9533-6092-0) regarding the 253 infantry division operating in the east.
Impressions can be read. Among other things, it shows the ratio of fragmentation and bullet wounds among military personnel of the division, 60 to 40%. The Infantry Division for 4 years of the war is a very good selection, and from it we dance.

We multiply 3.7 million troops of the Reich and its allies by 0.6, we get 2.22 million invaders who died from shrapnel wounds - most of them from artillery fire. Although the figure is very optimistic, the Finns have a ratio of bullet wounds to shrapnel according to the results of the Continuation Wars-Continuation 69% to 31%. We drop 120,000 for losses from aircraft and estimate the losses from artillery (including tanks) and mortar fire at about 2 million souls. We’ll throw another 100,000 into grenades. Everything here is very overpriced, but let it be. I will save the hearts of the saviors of the motherland.

Based on Ozeretskovsky’s “Wound Ballistics”, on the other side of the front, the average ratio for the war was approximately the same, adjusted for higher mortality from fragmentation wounds (scan.

2,000,000 / 900,000 \u003d 2.22 people.
4,275,000 / 350,000 \u003d 12.21 people .

I kiss on the forehead. The effectiveness of enemy tanks and artillery in terms of mortar or gun calculation, a platoon, a battery or a tank there exceeded the Soviet one about 6 (six) times.

If anyone, we can repeat the calculations together, not with approximate, but with exact numbers.
I can’t imagine how this ratio can be underestimated at least to 1: 5. But maybe I'm wrong?

One can continue to glorify the personnel policy of the most effective manager of the century in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s with "politically valuable" graduates of artillery schools, even those graduating without any knowledge of logarithms. Miracles in this world were obviously not expected to be atheists.

Appendix 7

Supplies and losses of artillery and ammunition in the Great Patriotic War

Table 46. The supply of artillery to the fronts from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 47. The supply of artillery to new formations in 1941-1944.

Table 48. Deliveries of artillery systems by industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 51. Deliveries by the industry of tank weapons from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 53. Ammunition consumption in 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

Table 54. Ammunition production in 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

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